what is a human being without desire?
and by this line of inquiry, i mean to ask two things, firstly, to what extent is a person anything less of a human being when he no longer has desires, and secondly, what would it be if a person had no desires?
and to get the definitions out of the way forthwith, a person is any generally rational human being with capacity, a human being is that species known generally as man, and desire is... either a) an interest in a scarce resource, either tangible or intangible, or b) an interest in the necessary resources which enables one to attain his objects, or in the consequences of his having attained those objects. one can thus appreciate immediately the distinction between, in a) ones' desires acting for things in themselves as well as, in b) those desires acting for the things with or for those desired-things.
damn, philosophy is hard. one is always grateful to scrape by.
for the first question, which i shall call the "human identity" question, i mean to ask whether the human identity necessarily includes desires. i suppose one immediately thinks of it from an ex ante point of view, i.e. given that we are born naturally with desires, extending in every case from one's being weaned to, at least, maturity, and therefore given that we understand ourselves to unequivocally have started with desires, whether we are any less human for rejecting them? (and by them i include, without careful consideration, one desire or all desires). are we any less ourselves? and this is, i truly believe, a difficult question. and it is still not yet the question, are we any less human.
suffice to say that i don't know the answer for the first part of this question, although i am very sympathetic to the answer that includes, and not only incidentally, the considerations of compassion for the rest of humanity and compassion for oneself. therefore if one has compassion in both these senses, one might come to see one's own desires in a slightly more trifling light, and indeed, understand one's humanity better through the lens of compassion, rather than that of desire. and if i may personally say so, i think it makes me a better person to reject every self-serving desire. yet i nonetheless cannot answer if charged with failing in this way, generally in practice and not in theory; but such is, indeed, very human, albeit of somewhat nebulous perfidiousness.
and to the second part of this first question, are we any less human? the question framed thus seems to come from a more objective view, detached as it were, asked by an observer. but what then is it to be human? i think, summarily, that what it is to be human is not to be defined hegemonically, i.e. by those who have the werewithal to dictate what it is to be human. indeed, it is my strong opinion that what it is to be human includes the liberty to defy might and its subversive tendencies. therefore, what it is to be human will benefit from including the perspective of every individual person. i have gratefully borrowed this line of reasoning, mutatis mutandis, from feminist perspectives, although i must admit to have a more generally inclined compassion than that which the latter, for the most part, maintains. again, i am aware that i have not answered the question adequately. therefore my short answer is no, given that, following the argument laid out, it is for no one (or everyone) to say what is or is not human.
as to the third part of this first question, which i shall call, for the former part the "provisional" question, and for the latter part the "consequential" question, the third part of this first question is generally concerned with the "associated things" of desires. to give a simple example for the former part, if one desires wisdom, one must desire the time to appreciate the teachings of learned men, and a corresponding example for the latter part would be, the desire for honour that comes with being regarded as wise. immediately, one might perceive that the "associated desires" question is not as vital or central compared to the "human identity" question. indeed, i included it for the sake of completeness, mindful that it might nonetheless illuminate the far ambits of desire. again, i think that this part is not insignificant. however, i think that this third part can be subsumed under the first and second part, as being indeed the same kind of question, i.e. what happens to our identity if we are able to reject desires and their associated desires, and therefore i shall leave this question not be further considered.
for the second question, what it would be like if one had no desires, i think that i asked it only to consider my own life. honestly speaking, i think that i truly have no desires. or at least, no selfish or petty desires. i know that i am proud in certain ways, and i desire to be right and good and just, and sometimes i want to let people who i feel are wrong know of it. but i ask, is it possible that by considering all these things to be temporary and ultimately inconsequential, i can regard them as nothing, and hence regard myself as being desireless? my answer here is a firm yes. i do think that i desire to be true to myself, which is the only reason why i have all these other characteristics and desires.
anyway i suppose the phrase goes, nemo iudex idoneus in propria causa est. sure, i think that's fair, no man should be a judge in his own cause. but i think that i am a good man, and not for the "consequential desires" reason either. and i have considered the matter long enough, and think that i am ready to go and die.
therefore going back to the question, i think that nothing matters for such a man except for the well-being of others.
a question that troubles me so, is how is one to be a good man without certain necessities being provided, by fortune, serendipity or Provision, to him? the analogy, albeit one against which i hold reservations, is maslow's hierarchy. but this is another question for another day.
